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In many respects, economic life in the United States has never been better. Per capita GDP
reached an all-time high of $39,921 in 2004. Real GDP grew by 3.6% over the last year,
modest by US standards but faster than Canada (3.0%), France (2.4%), Germany (1.5%),
Italy (0.8%), Japan (0.8%), and most other developed countries. Employment hit a record
141 million in April 2005, with the unemployment rate steady at 5.2%, well below its 2003
peak of 6.3%.
Despite these signs of prosperity, many professional observers see signs of trouble on
the horizon. Most of them trace their discomfort to the widely-reported trade and cur-
rent account de¯cits (\external de¯cits"), which they attribute to a low saving rate and a
government budget de¯cit. Representative samples of opinion include:
² Lawrence Summers (2004a): \The most serious problem we have faced in the last
¯fty years is that of low national saving, resulting dependence on foreign capital, and
¯scal sustainability. ... The current account de¯cit has widened sharply over the last
four years ... to an unprecedented rate of 5% of net national product. More than
100% of the deterioration of the current account de¯cit is accounted for by a drop in
national saving. ... The clear change in national saving ... comes from the increase in
the federal budget de¯cit, which accounts for the fact that the US now has the lowest
rate of national saving in its history."
² Stephen Roach (2004): \June's enormous US trade de¯cit should be a wake-up call
to America and the rest of the world. ... As long as the US continues to live well
beyond its means and as long as the rest of the world fails to live up to its means, this
seemingly chronic condition will only get worse. The imperatives of global rebalancing
are reaching a °ashpoint. ... The basic problem [is] a saving-short US economy that
is locked into the destructive spiral of ever-widening twin de¯cits."
² Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser (2004, pp 9, 22): \[We examine] ... US external
de¯cits and the ... international monetary system that is integral to their ¯nancing
{ a system whose stability hinges on the willingness of Asian central banks to hold
enormous amounts of US Treasuries. ... Our analysis suggests that the ... system is
fragile, and likely will prove unstable. Even if the United States continues to be able
to borrow on terms that other, comparable, debtors could not imagine, our analysis
suggests that the US is on an unsustainable and dangerous path. ... The de¯cits since
2000 re°ect the need for a low savings country to ... ¯nance large budget de¯cits."
² Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogo® (2005, pp 67-69, 73): \The speed at which
the US current account ultimately returns to balance, the triggers that drive thatadjustment, and the way in which the burden of adjustment is allocated across Europe
and Asia all have enormous implications for global exchange rates. Each scenario for
returning to balance poses, in turn, its own risks to ¯nancial markets and to general
economic stability. ... In our view, any sober policymaker or ¯nancial market analyst
ought to regard the US current account de¯cit as a sword of Damocles hanging over
the global economy. ... [In] our baseline simulation, in which [all] current account
balances go to zero, the dollar needs to depreciate in real e®ective terms by 33%."
² Olivier Blanchard (2004, p 20): \The dollar needs to depreciate."
² Joseph Stiglitz (2004): \America's huge ¯scal and trade de¯cits ... jeopardise future
American generations' well-being. As ... Herb Stein put it: `If something can't go on
forever, it won't.' But no one knows how, or when, it will all end. ... An even weaker
dollar is a strong possibility."
² Warren Bu®ett (2005, p 20): \As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own
less and less of what we produce. ... Should we continue to run current account de¯cits
comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the US by other countries
and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. ... [I]f foreign
investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would ... be delivering 3% of
annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the
past. In this case, ... the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers."
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2004) gives us the bottom line: \Let's be blunt
about it. The US is now on the comfortable path to ruin."
Are we on the path to ruin? It's never easy to predict the future. We recall that in
the late 1980s, Americans and Europeans alike were preoccupied with the success of the
Japanese economy. We moved on to other things when Japan entered a 15-year depression.
We think the current tendency toward panic is a similar overreaction, and see the situation
in much di®erent terms than the people quoted above. Our goal, however, is not to convince
you that everything is ¯ne, but to put the US current account de¯cit into perspective. We
do this by considering a broad range of evidence | broad in time, in country coverage, and
in range of variables | in the hope of getting a clearer picture of the current situation, and
perhaps some insight into its continuing evolution. We think this evidence goes some way
toward separating fact from ¯ction as we think about the likely causes and consequences of
the US current account de¯cit.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we take a quick look at external balances in
the US and other countries, including the US de¯cit and corresponding surpluses elsewhere.
In Section 3, we start to put this into a broader historical context by documenting some of
2the properties of external balances in developed countries. In some cases, we describe data
going back more than a hundred years; in others, we focus on the period since 1960. We
use the data to comment on several common propositions about external balances: that the
US de¯cit is unprecedented, follows from the ¯scal de¯cit, will lead to a real depreciation of
the dollar, and re°ects excessive spending by American households. We argue that most of
these propositions are ¯ction. In Section 4 we suggest an alternative: that US consumers
are spending because their wealth is high, and that capital is leaving other countries because
of poor performance. We discuss related issues in Section 5 and summarize our analysis in
Section 6.
2 The situation
The US is now running an external de¯cit of more than 5% of GDP. You can get a hint of
its origins from Figure 1, where we plot (gross national) saving, (gross private) investment,
and net exports over the last ¯fty years. Each is expressed as a ratio to GDP, with both
numerator and denominator valued at current prices. We de¯ne saving S as GDP minus
personal consumption and government purchases, so that
S = I + NX; (1)
where I is gross private investment and NX is net exports (the \trade balance"). This
de¯nition is somewhat unusual, but there are so many de¯nitions °oating around that it
hardly seems unreasonable to add one more. The °ow identity (1) retains the traditional
role of the external balance (net exports in this case) in reconciling saving and investment.
If the de¯nition of saving is novel, the message is not. The ratio of net exports to
GDP has moved from modest to substantial de¯cit over the last 25 years. There was a local
minimum in the trade balance of about {3% in the mid-1980s, then a return to balance in the
early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, net exports was again declining, hitting {3% in 2000 on the
way to {5.9% in the ¯rst quarter of 2005. The growing de¯cit necessarily re°ects di®erences
in the movements of saving and investment. Both exhibit short-run °uctuations over the
business cycle (they're procyclical), but their long-run movements are quite di®erent. While
investment has been a relatively stable fraction of GDP over the last ¯fty years, the saving
rate has declined gradually since about 1980. The trend in net exports mirrors the decline
in the saving rate. In Figure 2, we see that the long-run decline in saving re°ects a similar
increase in consumption, which rose steadily from 63% of GDP in 1980 to 70% today. The
issue, then, is that American households are consuming a substantially larger fraction of
GDP than in decades past, and that this increase is re°ected in a trade de¯cit of similar
magnitude.
3The cumulative e®ect of 25 years of external de¯cits is that the US net international
investment position has moved from positive to negative: foreign claims on the US economy
now exceed US claims on the rest of the world (Figure 3). The net international investment
position is now about 20% of GDP.
The US de¯cit is matched, of course, by surpluses elsewhere, but the numbers vary
substantially across countries; see Table 1. The largest surpluses are Japan ($172b, 3.7%
of GDP), Germany ($104b, 3.8%), China ($69b, 4.2%), Russia ($60b, 10.3%), Saudi Ara-
bia ($52b, 20.5%), Switzerland ($43b, 12.0%), and Norway ($$34b, 13.5%). The de¯cit
countries include Spain ($55b, 5.3%), the UK ($42b, 2.0%), and Australia ($40b, 6.4%).
Panel (c) shows us that advanced economies, in aggregate, accounted for a little more than
half the US de¯cit. Emerging economies accounted for about a third, split evenly between
the Middle East and Asia. What's left (the \world de¯cit" of $86b) remains a mystery;
our measures of current account balances do not balance worldwide, as they should. The
major oil producing countries (the Middle East, Russia, and Norway) collectively account
for about a third of the US de¯cit.
In short, the US is running a large external de¯cit that re°ects, in large part, a 25-year
increase in the ratio of personal consumption to GDP. Other countries, on the whole, are
running surpluses, with about half from advanced economies and a third from emerging
economies. The US de¯cit is by far the largest \imbalance" in absolute terms, but not as a
percentage of GDP.
3 The consensus reconsidered
The opinions we quoted at the start describe what Roubini (2005) calls the consensus view,
which goes something like this: The US is running an external de¯cit of unprecedented size.
This de¯cit is the consequence of a low national saving rate, which itself is the consequence
(at least in part) of a large government de¯cit. Since the current account is ¯nanced by
equal and opposite capital in°ows, the US external de¯cit is ¯nanced by foreign borrowing.
This can't last forever | eventually the interest on our foreign liabilities would exceed our
income | so we should expect to see the de¯cit shrink. Since the external de¯cit depends
on the relative price of local and foreign goods and services, the reversal will require a
decline in the real value of the dollar. Even so, our accumulated foreign debt will depress
the living standards of future generations. We don't argue that all of the people quoted
earlier claim all of these propositions as their own, but we think it summarizes a popular
line of thought.
4How persuasive is this line of argument? We break it down into its component \propo-
sitions" and discuss each in turn. In each case, we summarize the logic, use data to shed
light on it, and deliver a verdict: fact or ¯ction?
We rely, in most cases, on data for other developed countries (\advanced economies" in
the nomenclature of the IMF). We focus, in particular, on the OECD, excluding such new
members as Korea, Mexico, Turkey, and central European members of the European Union.
That leaves us with 15 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
For this set of countries, we construct three datasets. Quarterly series are taken from
the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts and Main Economic Indicators. We constructed
a longer annual dataset for these countries and a few others from the IMF's International
Financial Statistics. Finally, annual series prior to 1950 are taken from studies by economic
historians; most of the sources will be familiar from Backus and Kehoe (1992), Jones and
Obstfeld (1996), and Taylor (2002). The sample in this case includes Australia, Canada,
France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US (8 countries altogether). Details on
all of these sources are reported Appendix A.
The US external de¯cit is unprecedented.
Few articles on the US external de¯cit are able to resist calling it \unprecedented."
Certainly it's unlike anything we've seen in the US over the last ¯fty years | that's clear
from Figure 1. Figure 4 suggests that the term is less accurate for other eras and countries.
In the top panel of the ¯gure, we see that the US had at most modest de¯cits between
1900 and 1980. In the ¯rst half of the nineteenth century, however, de¯cits were more
common, with a de¯cit over 5% in 1815 and smaller but more persistent de¯cits in the
1830s and 1870s. Large surpluses have also occurred, with surpluses greater than 5% of
GDP during World War I and immediately following World War II. In both cases, surpluses
were short-lived.
In other countries, large imbalances have been more common. In the second panel of
Figure 4 we plot long series of the ratio of net exports to GDP for seven other countries
for which reasonably good data are available: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In these countries, both de¯cits and surpluses occurred
in about 5% of available observations prior to 1960, giving us imbalances greater than
5% roughly 10% of the time. Jones and Obstfeld (2000, Figure 3) and Taylor (2002, esp
Figure 1) make a similar point about the period from 1850 to World War I: that relatively
free mobility of capital prior to World War I was associated with larger current account
imbalances than we saw between 1950 and 1970. In several cases, large trade imbalances
5lasted a decade or more. In our historical dataset, Canada's de¯cit averaged 3.5% from
1870-1913; Japan's de¯cit averaged 3.5% from 1896-1905; Norway's de¯cit averaged close
to 4% from 1890-1912; Norway's surplus averaged over 10% from 1995-2004; Switzerland's
surplus averaged close to 6% from 1992-2004; and the UK's surplus averaged over 3% from
1892-1904. Such periods aren't typical, but they happen.
In Figure 5, we report external balances for a larger set of countries over the period 1960-
present. [more coming!] The most striking feature of the ¯gure is the substantial increase
in both de¯cits and surpluses over the last 15 to 25 years. If the US de¯cit is unusually
large, so are the surpluses currently run by Germany, Japan, and (especially) Norway and
Switzerland. Clearly the dispersion in external balances has increased sharply in the recent
past. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) make the same point about the EU, stressing the huge
de¯cits run by Portugal and Greece, which we do not include in our sample. Whether this
represents a return to the imbalances of a century ago or something new remains to be seen.
Verdict: it depends. If we regard evidence on other advanced countries as relevant to the
US situation, the proposition is ¯ction: there are numerous examples of large de¯cits and
surpluses in the distant and recent past. Alternatively, we might regard the US as unique in
its size and role in the world economy. As Obstfeld and Rogo® (2005, p 71) put it: \[A]ny
comparison based on the experience of small countries, even small industrial countries, is of
limited value." Perhaps the best comparison is the UK before World War I. Here there is
a stark contrast: the UK was a major source of capital for the developing world while the
US, at present, is a major destination for ¯nancial °ows from both rich and poor countries.
The US external de¯cit is the result of the government de¯cit.
The so-called \twin de¯cit" proposition is mentioned in the Roach, Roubini-Setser,
and Summers quotations above, as well as many other places. DeLong (2004) gives us a
particularly vivid version: \[Treasury undersecretary] John Taylor ... is not allowed to say
the obvious thing: that savings as a share of GDP has declined as a result of the big Bush
budget de¯cits." This line of thought was equally popular in the mid-1980s, when the US
was also running both external and ¯scal de¯cits. The logic of the proposition is that a
decline in government saving leads to a decline in total saving, which is then re°ected in
net exports as in equation (1). The key issue, of course, is the impact on consumption.
What's the evidence? Since 2000, the government surplus and net exports (expressed
as ratios to GDP) have both declined sharply; see Figure 6. DeLong cites similar evidence.
However, there is little connection between these two variables in general. If we look at the
period between 1990 and 2000, for example, we might as easily conclude that they move
in opposite directions. The second panel of the ¯gure is a scatter-plot of the variables.
6The correlation between the two is 0.15 for annual data between 1960 and 2004. Other
countries show similar patterns, with correlations of ¡0:08 (Australia), ¡0:05 (Canada),
¡0:06 (Switzerland), and 0.12 (Sweden). [more coming] The lone strong positive correlation
is Norway (0.57), with twin de¯cits in the 1970s and twin surpluses recently. [This is a
direct re°ection of oil, more later.] At present, Germany and Japan are running substantial
external surpluses with government de¯cits similar in magnitude to the US. In general, the
correlations between external and government de¯cits in developed countries are slight.
Others come to the same conclusion by di®erent routes. Chinn and Prasad (2003, Table
3) regress current account balances on ¯scal de¯cits and other variables. They ¯nd that for
rich countries, a 1% ¯scal de¯cit is associated with a 0.13% current account de¯cit. Similarly,
quantitative theoretical exercises by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) and Ferrero (2005)
suggest that in popular non-Ricardian models, a 1% increase in the ¯scal de¯cit leads to
about a 0.20% increase in the trade de¯cit. Neither line of work suggests that the US ¯scal
de¯cit can account for more than a small fraction of the US current account de¯cit.
Verdict: the proposition is ¯ction. Neither evidence nor theory suggests that the US
¯scal de¯cit plays a central role in its current account de¯cit. Figure 2 tells us why: the
steady increase in consumption over the last 25 years has been associated with ¯scal de¯cits
and surpluses alike. The puzzle is not why consumption is high now, but why it has
continued to increase over the last 25 years whatever the ¯scal situation.
Interest on foreign debt is becoming a signi¯cant burden.
The downside of foreign debt is the expense of servicing it. We quoted Bu®ett earlier
as suggesting that current trends could lead us to pay 3% of GDP to foreign owners in ten
years. Roubini and Setser (2004) do a more systematic analysis, with a range of possible
scenarios, but come to a similar conclusion. In the scenario that mirrors Bu®ett's, they
hold constant the ratio of net exports to GDP and apply a (nominal) interest rate on net
foreign debt of about 4.5%. Here net foreign debt rises from its current value of about 25%
of GDP to almost 90% by 2015. The current account de¯cit at that point is close to 9% of
GDP, which includes net interest payments to the rest of the world of 3% of GDP. In some
other scenarios, the interest burden rises further.
The logic is sound, but US data suggest that the interest burden may be signi¯cantly
more modest. For one thing, the yield on foreign claims in the US is now about 3% and
has not been as high as 5% since 1990. See Figure 7. For another, the yield on US-owned
foreign assets has been consistently higher than the yield on foreign claims on the US. With
gross positions increasing over time, net international interest income has hardly changed
as the net international investment position has moved from 13% of GDP in 1980 to ¡22%
7of GDP in 2004. The result is evident in Figure 8: over this period, net interest income
has never been larger than 1% of GDP. In the most recent year, the number was +0:3%.
(Yes, that's a plus sign.) Given the evidence, it's not hard to believe that net investment
income has much less impact on consumption decisions than (say) expectations of future
labor income.
These features of the data are equally well-known and puzzling. Is the di®erence in
yields the result of Asian purchases of low-yield US Treasury securities? No. We see the
same thing if we focus our attention on direct investment. Does it re°ect mismeasurement?
Possibly, but attempts to track down the measurement error have been unsuccessful; see,
for example, Matalino (2000). Could the interest burden get worse? Of course it could,
but the scenarios described by Bu®ett and Roubini-Setser both start with the premise that
the external de¯cit will continue for a decade. The evidence suggests instead that de¯cits
of this magnitude are unlikely to last more than a few years. External imbalances are
persistent, but they have a half-life of about 3 years. You can get a sense of this from the
behavior of the ratio of net exports to output for a panel of 15 developed countries. The
autocorrelations are 0.76 over 4 quarters, 0.58 over 8 quarters, and 0.41 over 12 quarters.
See Figure 9. Moreover, the quadrants of the ¯gure do not indicate much di®erence in this
respect between de¯cit and surplus countries.
Verdict: the proposition is ¯ction. Although external debt can, in principle, lead to a
signi¯cant interest burden, it has yet to do so in the US. This could change, of course, but
so could other things. Given the evidence, interest on foreign debt strikes us as a far less
important factor for US households than the growth rate of the US economy.
The de¯cit will lead the dollar to depreciate.
The consensus view continues with the proposition that if the US external de¯cit is to
shrink, the mechanism must involve a fall in the real value of the dollar, possibly a sharp
one. DeLong (2004) puts it this way: \Two major factors a®ect demand for imports: (a) the
exchange rate, and (b) the level of demand in the US. Two major factors a®ect demand
for exports: (a) the exchange rate, and (b) the level of demand outside the US. Barring
a severe recession in the United States or an exhorbitant spending boom outside the US,
it is the exchange rate that *must* move if the US current account is to be signi¯cantly
reduced." Modern dynamic theory makes no such claim for a strong connection between the
external balance and the real exchange rate, but this kind of analysis continues to dominate
popular discussions. Obstfeld and Rogo® (2005, pp 70-71) summarize the argument: \Any
correction to the trade balance is likely to entail a very large change in the dollar exchange
rate: our baseline ¯gure, with moderate adjustment speed, is over 30 percent."
8Is this fact or ¯ction? We're not alone in viewing exchange rates as the supreme challenge
of international macroeconomics. Decades of work has left us with the opinion that short-
and medium-term °uctuations are inexplicable, both before and after the fact. Frankel
and Rose (1995) is the classic reference, but more than a decade of work underlies their
conclusion. Their punchline is echoed nicely by Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000, p 381), who
remark: \No model seems to be very good at explaining exchange rates even ex post."
There is, to be sure, a statistical relation between short-run movements in the real ex-
change rate and the trade balance: °uctuations in real exchange rates (the ratio of foreign
prices to domestic prices) are typically negatively correlated with future trade balances,
positively correlated with past trade balances. This \J-curve" property has widely doc-
umented, but there are a couple di±culties in applying it to the current situation. One
is that the relationship is unstable; see, for example, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994,
Figure 2) and the references mentioned there. The other is that it pertains to short-term
°uctuations, which leave out virtually all of the movement in the US current account over
the last 25 years. The US current account de¯cit is an issue about the long run, not the
short run.
We consider the proposition directly: Do current account de¯cits (surpluses) tend to
be followed by depreciations (appreciations)? The answer, in general, is no. We show in
Figure 10 (for our usual collection of countries) that there has been no general connection
between the ratio of net exports to GDP and subsequent movements in the real e®ective
exchange rate (the IMF's CPI-based measure) over periods of 4 to 16 quarters. In other
words, knowing the trade balance has not been useful for forecasting subsequent movements
in the real exchange rate. There is, however, an exception: the US (Figure 11), where
the correlations increase with the time horizon. We hesitate to put much weight on this
(correlations between highly persistent variables are based on a small e®ective number of
observations), but it's only fair to note that US data agree with the proposition.
Verdict: we don't know. It would be nice to say that we understand exchange rates, but
it simply isn't true. We're reminded of a comment made by Leamer in reference to the many
studies of the impact of NAFTA. We recall him saying: \Any serious scienti¯c methodology
has to allow the answer, `We don't know.'" We think that's true here, but only time will
tell whether the US de¯cit is followed by depreciation, appreciation, or no change. Even
then, we won't know whether the change was luck or the result of a systematic relation
between these two variables. The absence of such a relation in other countries makes us
skeptical. The carefully quali¯ed language of Rosenberg and Folkerts-Landau (2002, p 80)
suggests the same conclusion: \The message ... is that certain economic disturbances may
cause exchange rates and the current-account balance to move in the same direction while
other disturbances may cause exchange rates and the current account to diverge."
9Americans are living beyond their means.
The bottom line of the consensus view is that Americans are overspending: by running
persistent external de¯cits, we are ¯nancing a consumption binge by borrowing abroad.
When the debt comes due, our living standards will su®er. Bu®ett (2003) describes the
situation with a folksy story in which the citizens of Squanderville borrow from the citizens
of Thriftville to ¯nance a level of consumption above what they produce. In one scenario,
future generations of Squanderville work harder and consume less to service the debt they
inherit. They are, as the saying goes, paying for the sins of their fathers. In another
scenario, the people of Squanderville decide not to service their debt, triggering a ¯nancial
crisis. Neither scenario is appealing.
Is that what we see? One way to address the question is to look at the balance sheet of
US households. If more claims on the US economy are owned by people outside the country,
has our net worth fallen? We use the Flow of Funds measure of household net worth, which
includes claims on the government and business sectors, including assets held by pension
funds. With this data, the answer is no; see Figure 12. The ratio of household net worth to
GDP remains well above its post-war average, even after the sharp drop in the stock market
in 2001-02. At the end of 2004, the ratio of net worth to consumption (4.2) was above its
peak value in the period 1950-1990 (3.6). Note, too, that the net international investment
position (¡20% of GDP) is small relative to household net worth.
One component of net worth that has not risen is government. The government's net
worth (capital stock at replacement cost minus government liabilities) has fallen over the
last 25 years, re°ecting both a drop in the capital stock and an increase in debt (with both
measured as ratios to GDP). If we add this to household net worth to get an economy-wide
net worth number, the results are only slightly less sanguine: consolidated household and
government net worth is also above its post-war average.
Household net worth itself re°ects a number of components. Figure 13 shows that the
most volatile component, and the one that accounts for most of the increase since 1980, is
corporate equity. The line in the ¯gure includes only direct holdings; if we included indirect
holdings through insurance companies and pension funds, it would be larger. Housing, on
the other hand, has increased gradually over the same period. As others have noted, there
has been an increase in market value, but much of the increase re°ects a rise in housing
valued at replacement cost. Piazzesi and Schneider (2005, Figure 1) perform a similar
analysis.
Verdict: the proposition is ¯ction. Although non-residents now own a larger share of
claims to the US economy, the value of the remaining claims is high by historical standards.
10If \living beyond our means" suggests spending income and assets we don't have, we're not
doing it.
Bu®ett's analogy evidently requires some modi¯cation. We suggest something like this:
the residents of Squanderville have a terri¯c new project. To ¯nance it, they sell 10% to
residents of Thriftville, whose own projects do not look as promising. When the project
proves to be wildly pro¯table, the people of Squanderville are happy to share the returns
with the people of Thriftville, who in turn are happy with the bene¯ts of access to foreign
projects. The mayor of Squanderville writes to Bu®ett requesting that their town's name
be changed to Entrepreneurville.
4 What's really going on?
If the consensus view is largely ¯ction, what's really going on in the world today? The
facts are clear: the US is running a large external de¯cit, US consumption and net worth
are high by historical standards, and many other countries are running large surpluses. We
explore these issues with a series of questions.
Why is US consumption so high?
With US consumption and net worth both high, it's not hard to imagine a connection
between them. Most models of consumption and saving lead to decision rules in which
consumption depends on net worth, expected labor income, and asset returns. The form of
the rule depends, typically, on the preferences of the agent and the stochastic properties of
labor income and asset returns, but consumption is invariably increasing in net worth.
Figure 14 is a scatter plot of consumption and household net worth for the US. We see
that in periods when net worth has been high relative to GDP, consumption has also been
high. The relation is not a decision rule (we're missing some of the components), but it
suggests an answer to our question: US consumption is high now because net worth is high.
Given the inverse relation between consumption and saving, it also suggests a rationale for
low saving rates. Quantitatively, this may not be enough. In most models of consumption
and saving, human capital (the capitalized value of labor income) is larger than ¯nancial
wealth. But if the values of ¯nancial and human capital are closely related (both might
re°ect the performance of the economy as a whole), then we would expect to see a relation
between consumption and ¯nancial wealth similar to Figure 14.
Why are so many rich countries running external surpluses?
11If high net worth helps us to understand the US, what do we make of other countries?
We saw in Table 1 that about half of the US de¯cit is matched by surpluses in Japan,
Germany, Switzerland, and Norway. If we ask why the US has a de¯cit, we might also ask
why these countries have surpluses.
Consider these countries in turn. Switzerland is a particularly striking case, so we'll take
it ¯rst. You can see in Figure 15 that investment dropped sharply in the early 1990s and
has yet to recover. With an average annual growth rate of real GDP between 1990 and 2003
of less than 1%, Kehoe and Ruhl (2005) label this a \great depression," so we might regard
the fall in investment to be a natural feature of an economic downturn. However, while
investment fell, saving remained steady, and a large trade surplus was a direct consequence.
This surplus implies the active accumulation of foreign assets including, no doubt, claims on
the US. Germany is less extreme but follows a similar pattern; see Figure 16. Investment
fell sharply in 2001 as output growth dipped below 1%. With saving °at, a substantial
trade surplus emerged. The largest surplus is Japan; see Figure 17. There we see that
a persistent trade surplus emerged in the early 1980s. Over that time, and particularly
since 1990, investment has fallen steadily. However, saving fell, too, so there has been
little additional impact on the surplus. Like the other two countries, a trade surplus has
been associated with poor economic performance. Conversely, the second and third largest
de¯cits after the US come from the UK and Spain, two countries whose growth rate have
exceeded the EU average over the last 10-15 years.
This tendency for countercyclical external balances has been widely documented for
short-term °uctuations; see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2004, Table 1), Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1994, Table 1), and Neumeyer and Perri (2005, Table 1). What's
di®erent here is the magnitude: the external imbalances we see today are much larger than
those documented in business cycle research. The bottom line, however, is the same: capital
tends to °ow into countries that are growing quickly, and out of those that are not.
Norway is apparently an exception; see Figure 18. Investment has fallen, yet output
is growing and the trade surplus is greater than 10% of GDP. The di®erence is almost
certainly oil: (non-permanent) price increases raise income and saving, but do not generally
lead to increases in investment. From a business cycle perspective the result is perverse,
with investment falling during a boom, but it's a natural feature of business cycle models if
you distinguish between productivity and oil shocks; see Backus and Crucini (2000). More
to the point, we see much the same thing Russia and Saudi Arabia, the two largest oil-
exporting countries. Saving rises and investment either falls or stays °at, leading to large
external surpluses.
The answer to the question, then, is that Japan, Germany, and Switzerland have been
12running surpluses precisely because their economies have su®ered through a period of un-
usually poor performance. Oil exporters are the reverse: their surpluses re°ect high oil
prices, not poor economic performance. Together these two groups of countries account for
about two-thirds of the US de¯cit.
5 Open questions
We think this is a coherent story for global imbalances, but it leaves some questions. Among
them:
Why is US net worth so high if saving is so low?
The rate of saving rate depicted in Figure 1 overstates net US saving; when we subtract
depreciation, saving is essentially zero. How, then can net worth can be so high? The
answer is that most of the change in net worth consists of valuation changes (capital gains),
which do not appear in NIPA measures of saving. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) show that
this has been a feature of US net worth for decades: most of the change in net worth comes
from valuation changes, not saving.
You can ask a similar question about the capital stock: if net investment has been °at,
how can household net worth be so high? Where does the value of these claims come from?
The primary source must be the stock of physical capital, but the net capital stock at
current cost has fallen slightly over the last 25 years. This decline re°ects two competing
forces. First, the price of investment goods, particularly equipment, has fallen, so that
a given fraction of nominal GDP now buys more capital. See, for example, Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997). Second, investment has shifted toward capital goods with
shorter lives, so the aggregate depreciation rate (nominal depreciation divided by the net
capital stock at current cost) has gone up, driving the net stock of capital down. The net
e®ect is that the capital-output ratio has fallen a little. But if the capital-output ratio
has fallen, why has net worth gone up? The answer is again valuation e®ects. Housing,
we know, has bene¯tted from positive valuation e®ects (see Figure 13), but apparently the
same is true of business capital. The source of the latter remains a subject of active debate,
but see Hall (2001) and McGrattan and Prescott (2005).
Isn't this all about Asian central banks?
A recurring theme in discussions of the US de¯cit is that a large fraction of it is being
¯nanced by Asian central banks. Some observers ask what will happen if they stop; see
13Roubini and Setser (2005). Others argue that this re°ects the central role of the US and the
dollar in global ¯nancial markets; see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, Garber (2003) and Ferguson
(2005). The numbers are these: At the end of 2004, the rest of the world held ¯nancial
claims on the US valued at $12.5 trillion, while the US held claims on the rest of the world
valued at $10.0t. The former included $1.9t in US treasuries and $0.8t in US agency issues,
of which about two-thirds was held by foreign central banks. These numbers are large in
an absolute sense, but they are a small fraction of total foreign claims on the US economy.
Does foreign debt make us vulnerable?
Some of the concern about the US international investment position comes from ex-
perience with emerging economies where international indebtedness similar to current US
levels has sometimes been followed by economic collapse. Could the same happen to the
US? We'd bet against it. One reason is that the US has much stronger institutions, which
give foreign and domestic investors greater assurance of repayment than they would face in
(say) Mexico or Russia. Another is that the form of indebtedness is di®erent. While much
foreign debt in emerging markets takes the form of (literally) debt, much of it issued or
guaranteed by the government, in the US most foreign claims are private, and almost half
consist of direct investment and corporate equity. This ¯nancial structure is less fragile,
and in our view is less likely to lead to the kinds of solvency problems that have plagued
debt markets in emerging economies.
What's going on in China?
China is now running a current account surplus of about $70b or 4% of its GDP; see Table
1. Figure 19 gives us some idea of its origins: both saving and investment are unusually
high, with saving higher than investment in the recent past. Are the Chinese saving too
much, as some have suggested? That's hard to say, but we see two reasons why the Chinese
might want to accumulate assets. One is a rapidly aging population, which suggests that
high saving rates may be necessary to ¯nance the old age of current workers. Another
is concerns over the stability of the ¯nancial system. The central bank's accumulation of
reserves will put it in a stronger position to deal with a banking collapse, should one occur.
How important are demographics?
To paraphrase Leamer again, we don't know, but it's possible we have given them too
little attention. Figure 20 shows that the age distributions of some of the world's largest
economies are substantially di®erent. It's not hard to imagine this leading to substantial
international capital °ows. Work by Attanasio and Violante (2005), Brooks (2003), Domeij
14and Floden (2005), Feroli (2005), Ferrero (2005), and Henriksen (2005) all show that de-
mographic di®erences can lead to large and persistent current account imbalances. Most
suggest that demographics alone cannot account for more than 1 or 2% of the 6% US de¯cit,
but that conclusion may change as our expertise evolves.
Have we entered a new world?
Modern theory predicts much larger capital °ows than we've seen over the last ¯fty years.
Could the global imbalances we now see be a sign that the world is changing? Perhaps.
Economists have been claiming for at least thirty years that we have no entered a world of
capital mobility, and it's probably more true now that we've seen in a century. It's possible
that the global imbalances we see now are a re°ection of that development.
6 Final thoughts
The world is a much di®erent place than it was just 10 years ago. International trade in
goods, services, and assets continue to grow faster than GDP and are now at all-time highs.
Current account balances show greater dispersion, particularly in the developed world, than
we've seen in a century. In the US, the current account de¯cit is close to 6% of GDP and
gross claims on the US economy are more than one year's GDP. In Japan and Germany, on
the other hand, current account surpluses are 3-4% of their GDPs.
What are we to make of these developments? One popular line of thought is that
these \imbalances" are a sign of trouble: they are the result of unwarranted spending
by US households and government and require \adjustment" or \correction." Even the
language is troubling. How could a reasonable person be in favor of \imbalance" and
against \correction"? Nevertheless, we think this interpretation is more ¯ction than fact.
We propose a second interpretation that we believe is suggested by the evidence. First,
spending by US consumers is higher because the value of their assets is high. This re°ects,
in large part, the relatively strong performance of the US economy. Second, capital out°ows
in several high-surplus countries re°ect weak economic performance: low growth and low
rates of investment. Roughly speaking, capital is moving from countries with low growth
rates of real GDP to countries with high growth rates. Other versions of this story have
been proposed by Bernanke (2005), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2005), and Engel
and Rogers (2005). Summers (2004a) puts it this way:
There is a standard set of things that the ¯nance ministers of countries with
signi¯cant current account de¯cits say, suggesting that such de¯cits are somehow
15a sign of economic strength. Perhaps the sharpest formulation that I have heard
is: `We live in a country that capital is trying to get into. Would you rather live
in a country that capital is trying to get out of?'
Summers is being facetious, but we think the story ¯ts the current facts quite well. Capital is
not only trying to leave Germany and Japan, it's succeeding. The surpluses of oil exporters
and the aging populations of Japan, Europe, and China, complete the picture.
In short, we see little to worry about. The world might very well change in troubling
ways in the near future, but there's little in current data to suggest it. Our guess is that the
Japanese and German economies will rebound, which would tend to moderate their out°ows
of capital, and that the price of oil will fall, which would do the same for oil exporters. Until
they do, we can expect to see large, persistent imbalances around the world { and that's
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19Table 1
Global current account balances
Current Account Balance, 2004
Country or Aggregate US Dollars (billions) % of GDP
(a) Largest De¯cits
United States {668.1 {5.7
Spain {55.3 {5.3




















United States {668.1 {5.7
Other advanced economies 354.1 |
Emerging economies 227.1 |
Middle East 102.8 12.4
Developing Asia 93.0 2.9
World (discrepancy) {86.3 |
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005.
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1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
The ¯gure is based on the expenditure identity: Y = C +I +G+NX, where Y is GDP, C
is private consumption, I is private investment (including the change in inventories), G is
government consumption and investment, and NX is net exports. The lines represent gross
national saving (S = Y ¡C ¡G), gross private investment, and net exports, each measured
at current prices and expressed as a ratio to GDP.
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Year
The lines represent the components of gross national saving (consumption and government
purchases) and net exports, each measured at current prices and expressed as a ratio to
GDP.
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
The lines represent the US net international investment position (US claims on the rest of
the world minus foreign claims on the US) expressed as a ratio to GDP. One line values
direct investment at current cost, the other at market value.
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Other Countries
The top panel shows the ratio of net exports to GDP for the US since 1800. The bottom
panel shows the same for seven other countries: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
The two panels picture ratios of net exports (top) and the current account balance (bottom)
to GDP for a subset of developed countries (list: ??).
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Government Surplus
The panels illustrate the relation between net exports and the government surplus. Both
series are plotted in the top panel. In the bottom panel, we report the same data as a
scatter plot. The correlation between the two variables is 0.15.
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Yields on US holdings of foreign assets and foreign holdings of US assets
Yield on US Assets Abroad



























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
The lines represent yields (income divided by investment position) on US holdings of foreign
assets and foreign holdings of US assets. In these calculations, direct investment is measured
at current cost.
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Net income on foreign assets
Consumption























1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
The lines represent net income on foreign assets (US income on foreign assets minus foreign
income on US assets) and consumption, both expressed as ratios to GDP.
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Ratio of Net Exports to GDP
The panels plot the ratio of net exports to GDP at di®erent dates: the ratio \n" quarters in
the future against the ratio now. The data are quarterly for 15 countries starting in 1980.
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Net Exports
The ¯gure shows the relation between net exports and the rate of appreciation of the real
exchange rate over 1-4 years in annual data. The correlations are 0.05, 0.07, 0.08, and 0.06.
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Net Exports
The ¯gure shows the relation between net exports and the rate of appreciation of the real





































1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Ratio of net worth to GDP for households, government, and the two together. Net worth
includes ¯nancial assets and durable goods, with housing at market value.
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Components of US Household Net Worth
Net Worth
Housing at Cost




















1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
The lines compare the ratio of household net worth to GDP with similar ratios for equity and
housing. Equity includes indirect holdings through pension funds and insurance. Housing
is reported at both market value and replacement cost.
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3 3.5 4 4.5
Ratio of Net Worth to GDP
The points represent time series observations of consumption and household net worth, with
both expressed as ratios to GDP. The sample period is 1952-2004. The correlation between
the two variables is 0.77.
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The lines represent components of the expenditure identity. See Figure 1.
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Year
The lines represent components of the expenditure identity. See Figure 1.
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The lines represent components of the expenditure identity. See Figure 1.
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The lines represent components of the expenditure identity. See Figure 1.
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Year
The lines represent components of the expenditure identity. See Figure 1.
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